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The history of humankind is a history of migrations. People’s tendency to move into new, more 
favourable areas has been a driver of the development of our societies for centuries. However, 
in the recent years, immigration has emerged as one of the most discussed topics in the global 
political debate. This is mainly due to the fact that most developed countries experienced a 
considerable growth of migratory inflows especially from developing countries. Data from 
Eurostat suggest that immigrant population from outside EU-27 to EU-27 significantly 
increased from about 1.5 billion in 2013 to 2.4 billion in 20181.  Economists have widely studied 
the effect that the increasing rate of migration have on the receiving countries. In particular, a 
lot of work has been done on the effect that immigration has on the labour market, (among 
others Card, 2001, Borjas, 2003, Peri, 2016) but also on crime (Bianchi et al., 2012) and 
educational outcomes (Brunello and Rocco, 2013, Ballatore et al., 2015). More recently, a 
brunch of Political Economy started to pay attention to the consequences that migration inflows 
have on natives’ voting behavior.  This issue is particularly relevant because in the last years 
we have assisted to an extraordinary rise in the support of nationalistic parties characterized by 
a strong anti-immigration stance across Europe. Studying how the natives’ preferences - as 
revealed through the votes - may be influenced by immigration is interesting from an economic 
point of view because, most of the time, they are driven by economic concerns. Moreover, 
natives’ voting preferences, by supporting a particular political party, have relevant 
consequences in terms of policy decisions.  
 
The objective of this work is to investigate if the increasing immigrant rates have an impact on 
the natives’ voting preferences. In this regard, the underlying assumption is that votes reflect 
citizens’ attitude towards the foreign population. This may be shaped by several factors, both 
of economic and non-economic nature. Among the first, natives are documented to be 
concerned about the negative effect that new migration inflows may have on the labour market 
and on the welfare state (Mayda, 2006, Facchini and Mayda, 2009). Also, another channel 
shaping individual attitudes towards immigrants may involve social and cultural factors. For 





they may perceive the foreign presence as a threat on their system of values and culture (Card 
et al., 2012). To better capture the natives’ reaction to immigrants’ exposure, I conduct the 
analysis at the municipality level, where the interactions between the two groups are likely to 
occur more often. For example, as suggested by Halla et al. (2017), a sort of competition may 
arise in the fruition of public services of the same municipality, like in the children admission 
to public schools. In the following analysis, I exploit the variability of immigration rate and the 
different voting outcomes in slightly less than 8000 Italian municipalities in the 2008, 2013 and 
2018 national elections. Focusing on national elections instead of more local ones allows to 
better capture natives’ attitudes towards new migration inflows, as the regulation of this 
phenomenon is established at the national level. I consider two main outcomes. First, following 
the existing literature (Otto and Steinhardt, 2014, Barone et al., 2016, Halla et al., 2017, Edo et 
al., 2019), I study if the increase of immigration rate shifts individuals’ vote towards party 
supporting anti-immigration policies. Second, I try to assess if the growing immigration 
influences the natives’ preferences towards redistribution. This latter approach slightly 
differentiates from the existing literature on preferences for redistributions, which mainly 
focuses on survey data (among others, Munard, 2017, Alesina et al., 2018, Alesina et al., 2019). 
Looking directly at the voting outcomes allows to investigate the impact that immigration has 
on policies. In this case, following the procedure of Moriconi et al. (2019) I construct an index 
on the level of redistribution preferences for each municipality, by linking each political party 
to an indicator on its position on redistribution, obtained by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
dataset. The higher the index, the higher is the support for those parties opposing redistribution. 
Subsequently in the analysis, I examine if the effect on anti-immigration parties is different 
with respect to immigrants’ nationalities of origin. As Brunner and Kuhn (2018) prove, the 
natives’ aversion towards foreign population may be driven by a xenophobic sentiment instead 
of by actual negative economic impacts, and it is likely to increase the higher the cultural 
distance. Eventually, I test if the effect is heterogenous with respect to some municipalities’ 
characteristics. In this setting, establishing a causal relationship between immigrant share and 
voting outcomes is not immediate. Their allocation across municipalities is not random, and 
some unobserved characteristics may affect both the dependent variable and the endogenous 
regressor, leading to non-valid estimates. To overcome this issue, I employ an IV approach in 
which the past immigrant settlement estimated with data in 1991 is used as instrument for the 
present share of immigrants. This approach, proposed by Card (2001), is widely used in the 
literature of migration and it relies on the absence of correlation between immigrants’ location 
choice in 1991 and the present political preferences. As Barone et al. (2016) point out, the 
choice of this instrument is particularly convincing in the Italian setting because of the rupture 
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in the Italian political scene with the scandal “Mani Pulite”, occurred between 1992 and 1994, 
which brough to the disappearance of the two main political parties at the time. The baseline 
results of the analysis show that 1 p.p. increase in immigrant share causes an increase of the 
support for anti-immigration parties of 0.620 p.p., while it increases the redistribution index of 
about 3 point in absolute terms, corresponding to an increase of 0.869 p.p. These results 
highlight a general negative reaction of citizens towards new migration inflows. Moreover, even 
if the effect on anti-immigration parties is expected to be stronger in case of exposure to 
culturally distant immigrants, the estimates reveal a positive and significant impact only when 
considering the communities from South America. The effect is not significant in the case of 
immigrants from Africa and Eastern-Central Europe, while it has opposite sign when 
considering population from Asiatic regions. A possible explanation behind these results may 
be due to the different integration processes of the second generations of immigrants along the 
language dimension. In particular, as estimated by Bisin and Tura (2019), a higher acceptance 
of minority cultures – characterizing citizens from South America - allows immigrants to better 
maintain their distinctive cultural traits, thus slowing their integration process in the society. 
When conducting the heterogeneity analysis with respect to the size of the municipalities, it 
emerges that the effect is driven by middle-size municipalities, while the result does not hold 
in case of big cities.  Also, results suggest that the effect increases with the taxable income per 
capita and with the share of children, while it is stronger in municipalities with a very low level 
of social capital. Eventually, it is driven by municipalities in the middle of the distribution of 
the unemployment rate. A detailed explanation for these results will be given in the text. The 
work is structured as follow: Chapter 1 briefly presents the immigration trends in Italy and the 
political and institutional background; Chapter 2 reviews the main literature of the subject; 
Chapter 3 discusses the data and the main empirical strategy; Chapter 4 describes the main 
results and adds additional findings with respect to the immigrants’ nationality and the 














1.1 Immigration trends 
 
In the last few decades, the foreign presence in Italy has significantly increased. According to 
Eurostat, in 1998 the immigrants’ share over the population was equal to the 1.7%, while today 
is it estimated to be more than the 8%. In particular, a significant growth in the immigration 
rate occurred at the beginning of the 2000. As Figure 1 shows, foreign citizens were about 2 
billion in 2003 and overcame the 5 billion in 2018. For the purpose of the following analysis, 
it is relevant to discuss the main countries of origin characterizing migration inflows in Italy. 
In 2008 the foreign citizens were 3.891.295, equal to the 6,5% of the overall population. Among 
them, a significant fraction was represented by immigrants from Romania (20,5%), Albania 
(11,3%) and Morocco (10,4%). The first 10 immigrants’ nationalities present in the Italian 
territory also included China, Ukraine, Philippine, Tunisia, Polonia, India and Moldavia. In 
2013, the total immigrants registered were 4.922.085, representing the 8,2% of the overall 
population. In this period, Peru and Bangladesh replaced Tunisia and Polonia in the rank of the 
top 10 nationalities. In 2018, the foreign-born citizens slightly grew up to 5.255.503, reaching 
to the 8,7% of the resident population. Among the most represented nationalities, Egypt took 
the place of Peru. In the Table 1 below, data on the main immigrants’ nationality for 2008, 2013 
and 2018 are displayed. It is interesting to notice how the Romanian population peaks over the 
others and how it has substantially increased: In ten years, it almost doubled from about 600.000 
in 2008 to slightly less than 1.200.000 in 2018. This depends in large part by the entrance of 
Romania in the European Union in 2007, making the migration flows across countries easier. 
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Important in this context, in 2015 Europe experienced an extraordinary increase of asylum 
seekers coming from areas of conflicts like Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Many refugees arrived 
in Europe overseas through the Mediterranean, landing in the ports of Italy, Greece and Spain. 
The total arrivals in 2015 was estimated to be 1,032,408, reaching the peak of refugees’ inflows 
in October 2015, to rapidly decline after to 373,652 in 20162 (UNHCR data, 2018).  
 
 




















2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Data source: ISTAT. Total foreign population on the 1st of January. 
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For what concerns the labour market, immigration is a rooted phenomenon, accounting for 
almost 11% of the total labour force, among which the 7,4% is made by non-EU citizens3 
(Ministry of Labour data, 2018). Data in 2018 suggest that the employment rate for immigrants 
from outside the EU is equal to the 60,1%, compared with the 58,2% that characterizes the 
 
3 Yearly Report on the immigrants’ communities in Italy, 2019: https://www.lavoro.gov.it/temi-e-
priorita/immigrazione/Pagine/Studi-e-statistiche.aspx 




Italian natives. This is due to a sort of complementarity in the labour market: immigrant 
population is typically employed in low skills jobs, characterized by low salaries. The 
unemployment rate for immigrants from outside the EU equals 14,3%, while it is 10,2% of the 
native population. Also, the inactive rate accounts for the 29,8%, compared to the 35% of the 
Italian citizens. Importantly, data are very heterogeneous with respect to the immigrants’ 
nationality of origin. The highest employment rate characterizes the Philippine group (82,2%), 
while the lowest concerns the Moroccan communities (45,2%). The unemployment rate is 
higher among immigrants from Nigeria (30,7%) to reach the lowest level among the Chinese 
(3,5%). Differences with respect to the nationality are also common among the types of job in 
which the immigrants are employed. Specifically, the ethnic specialization takes place: there 
are some communities that tend to specialize in one specific sector, due to relationships with 
individuals of the same nationality and words of mouth. In this regard, 36,5% of Indians work 
in the agricultural sector, 40,5% of Senegalese in the industry, 27,4% of Albanian in the 
construction sector, 36,9% Chinese in trade. Eventually a consistent fraction of immigrants 
from Philippine (59,5%) and Ukraine (60,8%) are employed in social and personal services. 
 
However, it is important to stress that data on immigrants rely on official registrations in the 
Population Registry Offices of the Italian municipalities. Fondazione ISMU, based on data from 
ISTAT, estimates that in 2018 there were 431.000 citizens that, even if legally present in the 
Italian territory, were not yet officially registered, and about 533.000 immigrants in an irregular 
position, as they lack a valid permit to stay4. The immigrant shares by municipalities I am going 
to use in the following are therefore likely to underestimate the actual immigrant presence. 
 
 
1.2 Political context 
 
Since this work relies on data on Italian national elections occurred in 2008, 2013 and 2018, 
this section provides a brief description of the main political forces acting in those years. The 
2008 national elections were won by the centre-right coalition, traditionally associated to an 
anti-immigration stance and promoting tough policies regulating new migration inflows. On 
the contrary, in the 2013, the most voted political party was the Centre-Left Democratic, 
typically characterized by a more open position with respect to immigration, highlighting the 
 




positive impacts it has in the domestic economy, especially in terms of welfare. It is important 
to stress that the 2013 national elections were marked by the participation of a new political 
force: the Five Star Movement Party, characterized by a strong anti-establishment, populist 
rhetoric and which gained the 25% of the whole votes5 (Ministry of the Interior data).  The rise 
of the Five Star Movement represents a rupture with the traditional Italian political system, 
departing from the typical political dichotomy which divides the political spectrum between 
right- and lift-wing parties. The 2018 national election saw the triumph of the populist forces 
in Italy. Most of the votes were directed to the Five Star Movement, while the most voted 
coalition was the centre-right alliance, dominated by the Northern League. This is a nationalistic 
party, born in the 90s’ campaigning for the independence on the Northern regions of Italy, and 
that in the last years has significantly gained support. In 2013 it accounted for about 4 % of 
votes, jumping to more than 17% in 2018 (Ministry of the Interior data).  The rise of the 
Northern League is part of a wider wave of nationalistic parties that interested the whole Europe 
and that in the recent years has gained incredibly support from the electorate. Among them, we 
find National Rally in France, the Freedom Party of Austria in Austria, Alternative for Germany 
in Germany, the UK Independent Party in the United Kingdom, True Finns in Finland and Law 
and Justice in Poland. These parties typically share the same anti-euro stance and strongly 
campaign for the necessity to implement tough policies regulating the immigration flows. For 
the purpose of this analysis it is important to stress that the migration has been a highly debated 
issue in the considering elections, especially in the 2018. Given this premises, a party position 























A growing number of papers in the literature explores the relationship between immigration 
and election outcomes, often emphasizing the effect on the support of those political parties 
typically associated with anti-immigration policies. One of the first studies demonstrating a 
causal effect between these two variables is given by Otto and Steinhardt (2014), that focuses 
on the federal and national elections in 103 districts in the city of Hamburg in the period 
between 1987 and 1998. They found that a 1 percentage-point increase in the share of foreign 
citizens at the district level led to a 0.225 percentage-point increase in the share of votes for the 
far right-wing parties. At the same time, this caused a decrease in the votes for the Green Party, 
the major political group that at the time promoted favourable policies towards immigrants. The 
empirical analysis consists in a fixed effect model which allows controlling for the unobserved 
heterogeneity between districts that is constant over time. Barone et al. (2016) provided 
evidence for Italy, which experienced a considerable growth of the immigration flows in the 
last two decades. Focusing on the municipality level, the authors found that 1 p.p. increase in 
the share of immigrants is associated to a 0.86 p.p. increase in the share of votes for the centre-
right coalition during the national elections. To establish a causal relationship, they employed 
an IV approach based on the exogenous variation given by the historical immigrants’ 
settlement. Interestingly, the authors found that the support for the right-wing parties is mainly 
driven by municipalities in the middle of the size distribution, specifically the result does not 
apply to big cities. Similarly, Halla et al. (2017) studied the effect of the local presence of 
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immigrants on the votes for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which supports nationalistic 
and anti-immigration policies and that in the last years became one of the main Austrian 
political force. Controlling for several community factors like labour market conditions, socio-
economic and demographic characteristics, both a fixed effect estimate and an instrumental 
variable approach reveal that an increase of the local share of immigrants is associated with an 
increase in the FPÖ votes’ share. Following a similar methodology, other papers focusing on 
different countries documented a surge in the votes for the right parties as a consequence of the 
increase in migration inflows. Among others, Becker and Fetzer (2018) found that in the UK 
parliamentary election an increase in the share of Eastern Europe immigrants brought a rise in 
the votes for the UK Independence Party. Edo et al. (2019) show that in France a growth of 
immigration rates leads to a growing support of the far-right candidates while reducing the 
support for the far-left. Peri et al. (2020) documented that in the US natives are more likely to 
vote for the Republican Party subsequently to an increase in low skilled migration inflows.  
 
One common methodology employed in this literature is given by an IV in which the past 
immigrant settlement pattern is used as an instrument for the present immigrant share. This 
strategy was proposed by Card (2001) and it is widely used in the literature of migration. Indeed, 
one of the main issues in this setting is that immigrants are not randomly distributed across 
municipalities because there could be some local unobserved characteristics affecting both the 
immigrant location decision and the output variable. For what concerns the correlation to the 
voting behavior, immigrants may decide to settle in more liberal areas where it is more likely 
that the population is less averse to migration. On the other hand, they may be forced to locate 
in poor districts where the negative economic conditions may foster a xenophobic sentiment. 
The immigrant location decision is therefore endogenous. In this regard, an instrument based 
on the past settlement patterns allows to establish a causality by exploiting the fact that 
immigrants tend to move to an area where a group of immigrants of the same ethnicity is already 
present. The identifying assumption is that local economic shocks that attracted immigrants in 
the past are uncorrelated with current political preferences, conditional on the full set of 
controls. A novel IV strategy was proposed by Harmon (2017), that constructed an instrument 
based on historical housing stock data. Specifically, he employed the share of the 1970 high-
rises stocks as an instrument for later immigration flows, exploiting the fact that high-rises are 
much more likely to be rented and that the composition of the housing stock is very persistent 
over time.  In this case, the underlying identifying assumption is that the characteristics of the 
1970 housing stock have no direct effect on changes in election outcomes between 1981 and 
2001, conditional on appropriate controls. An interesting study by Dustmann et al. (2018), 
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instead of the IV approach used in the above-mentioned works, tackled the endogeneity 
problem of immigrants' location by exploiting a policy that distributes refugees to the 
municipalities in Denmark on a quasi-random basis. Specifically, refugees are distributed 
proportionally to the pre-existing municipal populations and, importantly, municipalities cannot 
interfere with the allocation process selecting the number of refugees or their socio-economic 
backgrounds. Consequently, the refugees’ allocation is not correlated with past election 
outcomes. This setting allows the authors to find a positive and significant causal relationship 
between refugees’ allocation and the votes for right-wing parties supporting anti-immigration 
policies in the 1989–98 period. 
 
The relationship between immigration and far-right success is undeniably tied to the underlying 
attitudes of natives towards immigrants and immigration policies. However, even if the average 
effect of migration on the election outcomes seems to reveal an anti-immigrant sentiment spread 
among the European and US population, it is important to stress that this effect is very 
heterogeneous with respect to the characteristics of both the migration flows and the natives. In 
this regard, it is fundamental to discuss those factors that drive the latter to vote towards more 
anti-immigration positions and therefore what characteristics matter in determining their 
attitudes. In general, the literature suggests that natives’ attitude towards migration can be 
determined by several factors, both of economic and non-economic nature. 
 
Among the firsts, natives are concerned about the impact that immigration has on the labour 
market conditions (Mayda, 2006). If natives experience a relationship of substitutability with 
immigrants, they are likely to expect a negative effect in terms of wages and employability and 
therefore will tend to oppose new inflows. On the other hand, if there is a complementary 
relationship, the potential benefits due to immigration will lead natives to support favourable 
migration policies. Specifically, natives with the same skills as the immigrants are expected to 
lose from new immigration inflows, while those with different skills are expected to gain 
(Borjas, 2003). However, Peri (2016) suggests that high skilled immigration has an overall 
positive impact on the labour market conditions because it increases productivity and wages of 
all workers by boosting the human capital formation and innovation. In line with this latter 
result, Mayda (2006) documented a positive relationship between immigrants’ skills and pro-
immigration preferences in high per capita GDP countries. Consequently, natives are likely to 
oppose low skilled inflows of migrants because of the perception of a stronger competition in 
the labour market. In this regard, several pieces of evidence are consistent with these 
predictions, revealing that the votes for anti-immigration parties are positively associated with 
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low skilled migration, while, considering only high skilled migration, the effect has an opposite 
sign. In particular, Peri et al. (2020) found that an increase in high-skilled immigrants as a share 
of the local population is associated with a strong and significant decrease in the votes for the 
Republican Party. On the contrary, an increase in the low-skilled immigrants is associated with 
a surge in Republican votes. The estimates show that the pro-Republican effect of low-skilled 
immigrants was particularly strong in counties where the share of unskilled natives was higher, 
pointing out that the perception of the labour market competition is crucial in determining the 
attitude towards immigration. Similarly, Halla and al. (2017) found that the effect of 
immigration on the votes for the far-right parties is stronger in those areas where the 
unemployment rate is higher. 
 
Another important economic factor relevant in shaping the attitude towards new migration 
inflows is the consequences on welfare (Facchini and Mayda, 2009). The way immigrants affect 
the welfare state strongly depends on whether they are net recipients or net contributors. In this 
regard, unskilled migrants may be viewed as a net fiscal burden because they consume more in 
social benefits than they pay in taxes. On the opposite, skilled migrants may be perceived as 
net fiscal contributors, as they typically have a higher taxable income and depend less on social 
assistance. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that in case of low skilled migration inflows, 
natives are worried about the potential financial burden they represent and are likely to support 
those parties promoting though policies towards migrants. Otto and Steinhardt (2014), provide 
evidence in this direction, showing that only when considering the sub-groups of refugees 
among the immigrants - a category perceived to be highly dependent on welfare - the effect on 
the right-wing parties is positive and significant. Moreover, when the number of immigrants 
increase, natives may perceive a competition in the fruition of the local public goods. For 
example, if the number of immigrant children grows, the demand for schooling in a certain 
neighbour increases as well, inducing a perceived competition between natives and immigrant 
children and worries for insufficient child-support (Halla et. al., 2017). Importantly, the ways 
in which migration inflows may affect natives’ attitudes do not necessarily reflect their actual 
impact on the economy but rather natives’ perceptions on these potential impacts on the welfare 
system. Alesina et al. (2018), for example, showed that natives have strong misperception on 
the education and reliance on welfare state. 
 
A third channel shaping individual attitudes towards immigrants involves social and cultural 
factors. In this sense, an increase in the number of immigrants in a specific area may act in two 
different directions: on one hand it can incentivize the cultural exchange between natives and 
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foreigners, helping reducing prejudices - contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) - on the other hand 
natives may perceive ethnic diversity as a threat for the national culture, identity and traditions 
- group conflict theory (Pettigrew, 1998). In relation to the latter argument, Card et al (2012), 
by using the 2002 European Social Survey (ESS) found that the reaction to immigration is 
driven by concerns over compositional amenities, meaning that natives are worried about the 
changes in the composition of schools, neighbourhoods and workplaces. Compositional 
concerns are estimated to be highly relevant, explaining from 2 to 5 times as much of the 
changes in answers to the question of whether more immigrants should be allowed to access 
the host country with respect to concerns on the labour market conditions or on the welfare. As 
stressed before, natives perceive a competition in the fruition of local public schools (Otto and 
Steinhard, 2016, Barone et al., 2016, Halla et al., 2017) or perceive a negative impact that 
immigrant children may have on the school performance of their own children (Brunello and 
Rocco., 2013, Ballatore et al., 2015). Another important factor shaping natives’ political 
preferences towards immigrants involve securities concerns. Natives may have the perception 
that the growing presence of immigrants in the neighbour is related to an increase of criminal 
activities. In this regard, Bianchi et al. (2012) suggest that immigration does not significantly 
raise the crime rate in Italy. Precisely, immigration increases only the incidence of robberies, 
representing a very minor fraction of all criminal offenses, leading an effect on the overall crime 
rate not significantly different from zero. However, as already mentioned, it is important to 
stress that what really matters in determining the natives’ behavior and therefore their voting 
preferences is the perception of the impact rather than the impact itself. Sometimes the natives’ 
reactions are not justified but an actual economic or social consequence, but they may be driven 
by a xenophobic sentiment. Dustmann and Preston (2007) found that not only cultural and racial 
concerns are determinants of natives' attitude towards further immigration, but if the migrants 
are ethnically distant from the natives, this is the most relevant channel shaping preferences. In 
this sense, the ethnic composition of migration may play a role as it can be a source of 
prejudices. The immigrant presence may be seen as a threat because the natives’ system of 
cultural values and beliefs have to co-exist with a foreign system that could contrast with the 
existing traditional values, possibly generating a negative attitude towards foreign citizens. This 
mechanism is likely to be strengthened the stronger the cultural distance between immigrants 
and natives. In line with these predictions, Brunner and Kuhn (2018), proved that the presence 
of immigrants with a distant cultural background determines an anti-immigration attitude 
among natives, while the preferences are not affected when the immigrants are more culturally 
close. The authors, exploiting Switzerland's system of direct democracy to asses natives’ 
attitude, distinguish between immigrants sharing a value system close to the one of Swiss 
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natives - groups from past protestant and catholic non ex-Communist countries and from the 
English-speaking OECD countries - and those immigrants with a different value system 
according to the cultural heritage of the country of origin – groups from former Communist 
countries and from Asia, Africa and South America.. Another example of how the presence of 
a culturally different minority could represent a threat for the native communities is provided 
by Colussi et al., (2016). They exploit the exogenous variation in the distance of the election 
date to the month of Ramadan, a period in which Muslim communities become more visible to 
the public. The results indicate that both far-right and far-left parties gain substantial support if 
a vote has been cast shortly after Ramadan. 
 
In contrast with the previous results, strengthening the validity of the threat group theory, there 
is evidence that seems to be consistent with the contact theory, which predicts positive 
externalities in the contact between natives and immigrants (Alport 1956). In particular, this is 
verified under certain conditions: The equality of status of the different groups in contact; their 
cooperative interdependence in the pursuit of common goals; the presence of social norms 
supporting intergroup contact theory. In this regard, Gamaleiro et al., (2020) show that the 
presence of refugee centres in Italian municipalities promoting the immigrant integration 
(SPRAR) has a negative impact on the far-right and anti-immigration parties. Specifically, the 
effect is stronger in the case of small centres while it changes sign when they are bigger, 
pointing out that the cultural assimilation between natives and refugees may be compromised 
if the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted becomes too high. Similarly, Steinmayr 
(2020) investigates how different forms of exposure to refugees affect natives’ support for the 
far-right in Austria. In those municipalities experiencing a sustained interaction with refugees 
and asylum seekers, the support for the far-right fell by 3.86 p.p. in the national elections. This 
may be due to the fact that local authorities and NGOs operating in these municipalities to foster 
the immigrant assistantship and integration create a favourable environment which fulfilled the 
above conditions. On the other hand, in municipalities where the contact with refugees was 
transitory, the author documented an increase in the far-right vote share by 1.47 p.p. 
 
As previously stressed, what matters in determining the individuals’ response towards 
migration is the perception of the phenomena, and not its actual effect. Following Bellucci et 
al. (2019), although the real local presence of foreign citizens reveals to be a driver determining 
the natives’ behavior, its perception is confirmed to play a role as well. Perceptions are driven 
by media exposure that, in the pre-electoral period, tend to emphasize the issue creating a 
political debate around this topic. To assess the impact of perceived immigration on electoral 
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outcomes, the authors constructed an index capturing the increased salience and perceived 
threat of immigration associated with the refugee arrivals before the elections, finding that is 
positively associated with support for extreme-right, populist and anti-immigration parties. 
 
A more recent brunch of literature complements the discussed relationship between migration 
and natives' voting behavior directly investigating the preferences in terms of policies. One 
central issue in this context concerns the impact of the increase in immigration presence on the 
support for redistribution. More specifically, attitudes towards redistribution depend on how 
natives perceive the impact of immigration on their position with respect to the welfare state. 
In this regard, Edo et al., (2019) argue that individuals’ response can act in two opposite 
directions. From one side, the increase in immigration leads to lower support to redistribution 
and welfare policies, aimed to provide public services both to natives and immigrants. On the 
other hand, the increased exposure to risk given from the labour market competition and the 
consequent demand for insurance may favour redistributive policies. In this context, Murard 
(2017), using the European Social Survey (ESS), estimated that the effects of immigrant inflows 
on natives’ attitudes towards redistribution policies are different depending on the skill level of 
both migrants and natives. The respondents show that when unskilled immigration increases, 
low-skilled natives oppose more immigration while high-skilled natives tend to oppose less. On 
the other hand, when skilled immigration increases, high-skilled natives resist more 
immigration while low-skilled natives’ resistance remains the same or even declines.  Further 
analysis also indicate that native workers seem to support more redistribution and less 
immigration when the number of foreign workers in the same occupation increases. Taken 
together, these results provide strong evidence supporting the role of both welfare concerns and 
labour market concerns in determining individuals’ attitudes towards redistribution.  
 
A study conducted by Alesina et al. (2019), focusing in 16 European countries and employing 
the data on the EES, reveal that natives display lower support for redistribution when the share 
of immigrants in their residence region is higher. It interesting to stress that the attitudinal effect 
of immigration strongly depends on immigrants’ countries of origin and skills. First, 
immigrants from the Middle-East cause a more significant anti-redistribution effect than 
immigrants of other nationalities. Second, a higher presence of skilled immigrants tends to 
significantly attenuate the anti-redistribution effect of immigration. The authors also point out 
that the effect is stronger in countries with more generous welfare states (Nordic countries and 
France) relative to countries with smaller welfare states (the UK or Ireland). Similarly, Fouka 
et al., (2020) look at the Great Migration in the US in the first part of the last century and shows 
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that natives became less favourable to social policies in cities which received more immigrants. 
In addition, the effect is proved to be more accentuate when immigrants were culturally or 
religiously further away from the natives. Following the same direction, Alesina et al. (2018) 
perform an original survey on six countries (the US, UK, Sweden, Germany, Italy and France). 
They found out that natives are vastly misinformed about immigrants, regarding their number, 
country of origin, education level and reliance on the welfare state. Moreover, there is a strong 
correlation between natives’ beliefs about immigrants and their preferences for redistribution. 
In the literature of migration and preferences for redistribution, Moriconi et al. (2019) were the 
first that studied the preferences for redistribution by directly looking at the voting behavior, 
instead of using survey data. Specifically, they focus on European elections between 2007 and 
2016, matching information of the votes of 126 parties with their political agenda classification 
in matter of redistribution, obtained by the Manifesto Project Database. They found that larger 
inflows of highly educated immigrants are associated to votes towards parties supporting 
welfare state expansion, while less educated migrants lead natives to vote towards parties less 
















3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The dataset employed in the analysis consists of a panel of slightly less than 8000 Italian 
municipalities observed in 2008, 2013 and 2018 for which I combined information on the share 
of foreign citizens with the national election outcomes. 
 
Data on Italian municipalities come from the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT). In particular, 
for the years of interest, I collected data on the population, the number of foreign-born citizens 
and their country of origin on the 1st of January. The ISTAT also provided information on other 
territorial characteristics like the municipality area in squared kilometres, the GDP growth at 
the regional level (NUTS-2) and the 2011 classification on the Local Labour Systems (Sistemi 
Locali del Lavoro). Moreover, information used to compute municipality time-invariant 
covariates like the share of graduates, the employment rate, the taxable income pre capita, the 
aging index and the social capital index - proxied as the number of active non-profit units per 
1000 habitants - has been extracted from the ISTAT Census held in 2011. The dataset, however, 
does not provide data on the exact number of immigrants by municipality and country of origin 
in 1991, information that would be essential to construct the instrument required for the 
identification. To recover this problem, I combined data from two different sources. 
Specifically, I followed the procedure used by Barone et al. (2016) to impute the number of 
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immigrants by municipality and nationality in 1991 by using the residence permits by province 
and country of origin (coming from the Italian Ministry of Interior) and the  municipalities’ data 
on the macro-area of origin of the immigrants citizens in 1991 (coming from ISTAT). A more 
detailed explanation of the construction of the instrument will be done in the following chapter. 
 
Data on municipalities were then merged to national election outcomes for 2008, 2013, and 
2018, which have been drawn from the Italian Ministry of Interior. Specifically, I used the data 
for the elections of the Chamber of Deputy, as there is not a minimum age required to vote - on 
the contrary to the Senate, in which the minimum age is 25 years old - and therefore it better 
captures the overall citizens’ political preferences. Each party has then been linked to an 
indicator of its position with respect to migration and redistribution policies, obtained from the 
Chapel Hill dataset. In the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), two hundred political experts 
classify European political parties according to their viewpoint in matter of European 
integration, policy issues and, more in general, their underlying ideology. I used two different 
waves of surveys, specifically the 1994-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, for which I could 
extract the Italian party classification for the year 2008 and 2013, and the 2019 Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey, for which I could recover information for the parties in 2018.  
 
 
3.1.1 Output variables 
 
The first aim of this study is to investigate if an increase of the share of immigrant citizens leads 
natives to vote for political parties supporting anti-immigration policies. The underlying 
assumption is that the voting preferences reflect individuals’ attitudes towards migration. As 
previously discussed, the natives’ behavior is shaped by several factors, involving both 
economic and non-economic concerns. Therefore, once we are able to establish a causal 
relationship, we can interpret the increase in the support for the anti-immigration parties as a 
general discontent of natives perceiving a negative impact of migration inflows. This approach 
quietly follows the existing literature on migration and voting, which mainly uses the share of 
votes for the right-wing or far-right parties as dependent variable to evaluate the individuals’ 
reaction to an increase in immigration (Otto and Steinhardt, 2014, Barone et al., 2016, Halla et 
al., 2017). However, to avoid the risk of an inaccurate generalization in associating right-wing 
parties and anti-immigration policies support, in computing the dependent variable I include 
only those parties with a strong anti-immigrant stance as classified by the CHES dataset. 
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Specifically, I considered the votes of those parties that are in the 75th percentile of the 
distribution on the “IMMIGRATE_POLICY” indicator in the CHES classification for every 
election year6. In the survey, experts are asked to assign a value to the party’s “position on 
migration policy”, ranged from 0 (the party strongly opposes tough migration policy) to 10 (the 
party strongly favours tough migration policy). The denominator of our share is computed as 
the difference between the turnout and the invalid votes, involving both null and non-valid 
votes. 
The second objective of the analysis consists in testing whether the increase in immigration and 
the consequent change in voting behavior can be interpreted as a change in preferences towards 
redistribution policies. Differently from most of the existing literature on the topic, which asses 
the population preferences for redistribution through survey data (Alesina et al., 2018, Alesina 
et al., 2019) , I focus on the redistribution preferences as revealed by the votes. This approach 
allows to analyse more directly the implication that an increase of immigration has on policies. 
Natives’ attitudes towards redistribution depend on how they perceive the impact of 
immigration on their position with respect to the welfare state. In this regard, Edo et al. (2019) 
argue that individuals’ response can act in two opposite directions. From one side, the increase 
in immigration leads to decrease the redistribution support, because of the net social cost it is 
perceived to represent. On the other hand, the increased exposure to risk given from the labour 
market competition and the consequent demand for insurance may favour the support for 
redistributive policies. In this case, I construct the dependent variable as an index reflecting the 
citizens’ preferences in matter of redistribution based on the overall municipality’s election 
outcomes. Following a procedure similar to the one employed by Moriconi et al., (2019), which 
associated to each European party an indicator on its position on welfare state expansion, I 
linked every Italian party to the correspondent indicator on redistribution, obtained from the 
CHES dataset7. Specifically, experts are asked to assign a value on the “position on 
redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor”, ranged from 0 (the party strongly favours 
redistribution) to 10 (the party strongly opposes redistribution).  As the level of redistribution 
may slightly varies in different years, I associated the policy indicators for each party at the 
beginning of the period of the analysis. In this way, variation in local preferences are a 
consequence of the shift to one party to another and not of the change of the indicator’s value. 
 
6 For 2008 the anti-immigration parties are People of Freedom and Northern League; for the 2013 and 2018 
Forward Italia, Northern League and Brothers of Italy. 
7 The main parties in the 2008, 2013 and 2018 election as classified by the CHES dataset are: People of 
Freedom, Democratic Party, Union of the Centre, Forward Italy, Italy of Values, Northern League, Brothers of 




The index is constructed as an average of all the parties vote share weighted by the associated 
redistribution index. Therefore, the higher the index, the stronger a party opposes to 
redistribution policies. As it emerges from Table 1 below, the computed index for Italian parties 
ranges from a minimum of 0.218 to a maximum of 7.130. Table 2 summarizes the main 


















   
 
Anti-immigration parties share 0.389 0.141 0.004 
 
0.870 
Redistribution index 4.656 0.744 0.218 7.130 
Share of immigrants 0.060 0.042 0 
 
0.382 
Population 7632         42958         29 2872800 
Population density 300.19     648.99    0.766     12380.3 





   
Aging index 1.823    1.085    0.348          18 
Employment rate 0.444     0.078 0.18 0.74 
Social Capital Index 6.470       4.762           0 88.235 
Share of graduates 0.086 0.032 0.006 0.345 
Table 2 




3.2 Identification strategy 
 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of immigration on the voting behavior of 
natives. Specifically, I try to understand if the latter, in response to an increase of the 
immigration share, change their voting behavior towards anti-immigration parties and their 
preferences towards redistribution policies. To achieve this objective, I exploit the variation in 
immigrants shares and the variation in the national election voting outcomes in slightly less 
than 8000 Italian municipalities in 2008, 2013 and 2018. This setting allows to capture natives’ 
reaction to immigration and how it affects policies, since foreign citizens are not comprised in 
the electorate. If that had been the case, the voting outcome would have also included 
immigrants’ political preferences, reasonably supporting those parties with a more open stance 
towards immigration.  Moreover, it is possible to rule out the problem of naturalization, as 
applying and obtaining the Italian citizenship is a long process that takes several years. Also, 
focusing on the national elections, instead on the local ones, better reflects citizens’ attitudes 
towards issues like migration or redistribution, as they are often regulated by national laws. 
 
Ideally, the estimated regression would be: 
 
𝑦𝑚𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ +  𝜆𝑚 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡          (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑚𝑡 is the dependent variable expressed as the share of valid votes for anti-immigration 
parties in the municipality m and in the election year t (t = 2008, 2013, 2018) or, similarly, as 
the redistribution index in the municipality m and the election year t.  𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 is 
my regressor of interest, namely the share of foreign citizens over the total population in 
municipality m and in year t. 𝑋𝑚𝑡
′  is a vector including time-variants variables like the total 
population to capture demographic dynamics; the GDP growth at regional level (NUTS-2) to 
control for local business cycle that may play a role in affecting both the population political 
preferences and the migrants decision to settle in a certain geographic area; the population 
density to control for non-linear urban effect. 𝜆𝑚 represents the municipality fixed-effect, 
capturing the unobserved time-invariant characteristics in a municipality m, 𝜇𝑡 is the time fixed 
effect, and 𝑚𝑡 is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. 
Moreover, 𝑋𝑚𝑡
′  include some time-invariant covariates computed from the 2011 Population 
Census (ISTAT) like the share of graduates, the employment rate, a proxy for social capital 
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expressed as the number of active non-profit units every 1000 inhabitants, an aging index 
computed as the ratio of population over 60 and population below 20 years old. The main 
descriptive statistics for these variables are described in the Table 2 above. 
 
Implementing the municipality fixed effect allows to control for omitted variable bias due to 
unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities that is constant over time. However, by 
exploiting only the within-municipality variability, the estimates result weak and non-
significant. To overcome this problem, one possible solution consists to substitute the 
municipality fixed effect with the Local Labour System fixed effect (LLS). These are defined 
as a total of 669 territorial units where population live and work and where most of their social 
and economic interaction occur. Specifically, they are classified by the ISTAT based on the 
daily individuals transfer from home to work, as revealed during the 2011 population Census. 
The motivation of a territorial classification beyond the usual administrative division depends 
on the necessity to identify and analyse the economic and social characteristics of an area where 
citizens tend to organise economic and social activities. Implementing the LLS fixed effect in 
the estimation strategy allows to control for time-invariant unobserved characteristic at the LLS 
level, allowing higher variability with respect to the municipality level and therefore producing 
significant estimates. Even if the municipality fixed effect would theoretically lead to more 
precise estimates, implementing the LLS fixed effect is a valid alternative solution. In fact, the 
source of bias form unobserved factors is likely to be similar in spatial unit where people tend 
to experience economic and social relations rather than limit the analysis in mere administrative 
borders. However, to further control for the municipality variability within a certain Local 
Labour System, I keep in the regression time-invariant covariates at the municipality level. 
Given these considerations, 𝜆𝑚 in eq. 1 indicates the LLS fixed effect. Consequently, errors are 
clustered at the LLS level. 
 
 
3.2.1 Instrumental variable approach 
 
Even when introducing the LLS fixed effects, the impact of immigration on voting cannot be 
interpreted in a causal way: an explanatory variable may correlate with the error term, violating 
the OLS assumptions for consistent estimates. In fact, as widely confirmed by the existing 
literature, the immigrant share is likely to suffer of endogeneity issues. First, this can be due to 
an omitted variable problem. There can be some unobserved characteristics affecting both the 
immigrants’ location decision in a certain area and the political outcome. For example, as 
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Barone et al. (2016) point out, a positive productivity shock may positively affect both the 
labour demand for immigrants of the local firms, leading to an higher concentration, and the 
votes in favours of the right-wing parties, as they have typically a favourable stance towards 
firm policies. Moreover, the regression is likely to suffer of reverse causality issues. In this 
case, immigrants may tend to locate in more liberal and immigrant-welcome areas, while they 
may try to avoid those municipalities hostiles to foreign population and where nationalistic 
parties already have a considerable support. To address this issue, the literature proposes an 
instrumental variable strategy based on the immigrants’ past settlement pattern. Specifically, 
Card (2001) proposed an instrument that predicts the number the actual presence of foreign 
citizens by exploiting the immigrants’ tendency to settle in areas where individuals of the same 
country of origin had already settled. The motivation behind this idea is that when an individual 
decides to move in a foreign country it is easier to interact to and find support from people of 
the same culture and language.  
 
For the purpose of my analysis, I construct the instrument based on the immigrants’ lagged 
settlement pattern by exploiting their location in 1991. As I will discuss later, choosing a base 
year far from the beginning of period of the analysis is fundamental to obtain reliable and 
consistent estimates. However, given the lack in the data on the exact number of immigrants by 
country of origin settled in a certain municipality, I could construct the instrument by following 
the imputation procedure used by Barone et al. (2016). Specifically I could recover the number 
of immigrants in the Italian municipalities from a certain nationality in 1991 by dividing the 
number of residence permits of that nationality by the number of residence permits by macro-
area of origin at the province level and multiplying this ratio by the number of the immigrants 
from a specific area of the world in the municipalities. The underlying assumption in this 
procedure is that the immigrants from a certain nationality are equally distributed across the 
municipalities in the same province. Calling 𝑍𝑚𝑡 the instrument for the share of immigrants in 
the municipality m in year t, I obtained: 
 





                (2) 
 
Where 𝛿𝑚𝑐1991is the imputed share of immigrants of nationality c in municipality m in 1991, 
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑡 is the number of immigrants from country c at the national level in year t, 
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𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑡 is the total population in municipality m in year t. N is the number of top foreign 
nationalities of immigrants in 1991.8 
 
The following first stage regression is: 
 
𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑍𝑚𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ +  𝜆𝑚 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑢𝑚𝑡              (3) 
 
Hence, the resulting second stage regression is: 
 
𝑦𝑚𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡̂ + 𝛾2  𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ + 𝜆𝑚 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜂𝑚𝑡                 (4) 
 
Where 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡̂  is the predicted value of 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡, obtained by 
running the first stage regression. The parameter of interest, 𝛾1, corresponds to the ratio between 
the coefficients obtained by regressing 𝑦𝑚𝑡 on 𝑍𝑚𝑡̃   and the coefficients obtained by regressing 
𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 on 𝑍𝑚𝑡̃ , where 𝑍𝑚𝑡̃  is the residual obtained in the regression of  𝑍𝑚𝑡 on 
 𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ . The IV estimation needs two assumptions to be verified: the relevance and the exogeneity 
of the employed instrument. The first requires that the correlation between the endogenous 
variable and the instrument is different from zero. As Table 3 shows, the estimated coefficients 
are strong and significant both with an OLS model and with a fixed-effect model including 
time- invariant and time-variant covariates. By focusing on the specifications with the fixed 
effect, which controls for time invariant heterogeneity, the coefficient of the instrument is 0.185 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Also, the F-test is 96,72, way higher than 10, the 
cut-off used as a rule-of-thumb to determine if an instrument is strong (Stock, Wright and Yogo, 
2002). These considerations assure that the relevance condition is satisfied. In addition, the 
exogeneity assumption relies on the fact that the correlation between the instrument and the 
error term must be zero. In this case the instrument affects the dependent variable only through 
the effect on the endogenous regressor, meaning that the immigrants’ decision to settle in 1991 
does not affect natives’ political preferences in the 2008, 2013 and 2018 and it is not affected 
by other omitted variables. Even if we cannot check formally if this assumption holds, we can 
rely on intuition. As pointed out in Barone et al. (2016) the exogeneity of the instrument can be 
justify by the political scandal occurred in Italy in the 1992, the so called “Mani Pulite”. This 
brought to the disappearance of the two main political parties: Christian Democracy and the 
 
8 These are Albania, Bangladesh, China, Ecuador, Egitto, Jugoslavia, Filippine, Ghana, India, Marocco, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Perù, Polonia, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia 
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Italian Socialist Party. Importantly for the identification, given that in the first years of the 90’s 
immigration was a rather sporadic phenomenon, none of these parties showed a particular anti-
immigrant stance. Moreover, most of the parties included in the analysis appeared in the Italian 
political scene after 1991-1992. In particular, Forward Italia was founded in 1994 and Northern 
League participated in the national political election the first time after the 1991. Also, the rise 
of Five Star Movement Party occurred in 2011 represents a break in the traditional Italian 
political spectrum. These considerations allow to state that the immigrant’s location decision in 
1991 is very unlikely to be correlated with political preferences of the following years, and that 
the exogeneity of the instrument is satisfied. Given that both the relevance and exogeneity 
assumptions are fulfilled, I can argue that an instrumental variable approach allows to determine 
a causal relationship between the immigrant share and the voting outcomes. Specifically, the 












        (1) 
           OLS 
(2) 
FE 
                                                                    Share of immigrants 
Shift Share Instrument 0.329***    
(0.0296)  
0.185***    
(0.0188)  
Time-variant controls YES YES 
Time-invariant controls YES YES 
F-Test 123.58 96.72 
Observations 22,054 22,054 
R-squared 0.2822 0.0288 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Column 2 
includes Local Labour Market fixed effects. Time-invariant and time-variant control at 
the municipality level, yearly GDP at the regional level and year dummies are include. 












In this section, the main results of the analysis are presented. First, I provide evidence of the 
impact of immigration on the votes for anti-immigration parties. Then I test if the change in 
voting behaviors is associated to a shift in natives’ preferences towards redistribution policies. 
Eventually, I show how the effect on voting is heterogeneous with respect to the immigrants’ 
ethnic composition and other municipalities’ characteristics. 
 
4.1 Voting for anti-immigration parties 
 
The first part of the analysis consists in finding a causal relationship between the share of 
immigrants and the share of votes for anti-immigration parties. This approach quietly follows 
the existing literature on migration and voting, which mainly uses the share of votes for the 
right wing or far-right parties as dependent variable. As stated before, to obtain a more precise 
classification to those Italian parties that promote tough policies towards migrants, I exploit the 
CHES dataset. 
I started the analysis with the OLS specification without the Local Labour System fixed effects 
and including the time-invariant covariates by municipality. The estimated coefficient in 
Column 1 (Table 4) shows a positive and statistically significant correlation between the 
immigrant share and the votes for anti-immigration parties. Specifically, a 1 p.p. increase in the 
share of immigrant correlates with a 0.208 p.p. increase in the share of votes for anti-immigrant 
parties. The result significantly decreases in magnitude when I introduce the Local Labour 
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market fixed effects, keeping the time-invariants control to better control for the heterogeneity 
across municipalities within the same LLS. In Column 3 I employ the IV estimator to tackle the 
endogeneity of the independent variable, bringing the coefficient on votes to be higher and more 
statistically significant. Precisely, the results suggest that a 1 p.p. increase in the share of 
immigrants leads to a 0.62 p.p. increase in the votes share for anti-immigration parties, proving 
that the OLS estimates were downward biased. It is interesting to compare this result with the 
one found in the study by Barone and al. (2016), which focuses as well on the Italian context, 
and in which the estimated coefficient is larger (0.89). There could be two possible explanations 
behind the difference in the estimates with the previous work. The first is that two different 
outcomes are considered. While Barone et al. (2016) use the share of votes for the centre-right 
coalition as the dependent variable, I use the votes for anti-immigration parties, as classified by 
the CHES dataset. The second reason is that the years of the analysis are different. The panel 
data used in this work follows the same municipality in 2008, 2013 and 2018 while Barone et 
al. (2016) focus on 2002, 2006 and 2008. This is reasonably a fundamental difference, as the 
Italian political scene completely changed after the 2011 with the appearance of the Five Star 
Movement and its initial significant support. Declared to be free to any traditional classification 
between right- or left-wing party, a consistent fraction of the electorate of both the wings of the 
political spectrum shifts their votes to this novel party. In general, the baseline results suggest 
that, on average, natives perceive the increase to immigrants’ exposure in a negative way. As 
briefly discussed, this may be due to the negative impact immigration is perceived to have in 
the labour market competition or in the welfare state. Also, it may derive from non-economic 


























Immigrant share   0.208*** 
(0.0350) 
        0.053*  
(0.0319) 
     0.620*** 





   2.50e-08   
 (1.39e-08) 




-0.000012***    
(3.43e-06) 





   (0.1067) 
Social capital index -0.002*** 
(0.0004) 








-0.434***    
  (0.0441) 






Aging index  0.009***  
  (0.0015) 
-0.0011 
 (0.0018) 
0.002   
 (0.0021) 
LLS FE NO YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 22,054 22,054 22,054 
R-squared 0.3959 0.3305   0.3471 
 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Column 2 and 3 
include Local Labour Market fixed effects. Time-invariant and time-variant controls at the 
municipality level, yearly GDP at the regional level and year dummies are included in all the 
specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in column 1 and at the Local 




4.2 Preferences towards redistribution policies 
 
The second objective of this study investigates if an increase in the immigrant share leads to a 
shift of natives’ preferences towards redistribution policies. Differently from most of the 
existing literature on the topic, which is based on survey data, I focus on natives’ opinion in 
matter of redistribution as revealed by the votes. The dependent variable is an index of 
redistribution preferences by municipality constructed by linking to each political party an 
indicator of its level of support to redistribution policies, obtained by the CHES dataset. The 
higher the index, the higher the support for parties that more oppose redistribution. Both column 
1 and 2 of Table 5, which use OLS respectively without and with LLS fixed effect, show a 
positive relationship between the growth in immigrant share and support for those parties less 
favourable to redistribution. In particular, when the LLS fixed effects are included, the 
coefficient substantially drops. By focusing on the preferred specification, which includes both 
the LLS and the IV estimator (column 3), it highlights that 1 p.p. increase in the share of 
immigrants causes the redistribution index to increase by  3.115 in absolute terms, meaning that 
when the presence of foreign citizens rises, natives tend to votes parties more reluctant to 
promote redistribution policies. These results are in line with Alesina et al. (2018) and Alesina 
et al. (2019). Specifically, in the latter, when individuals have a strong misperception about the 
size of the immigration phenomena and its characteristics, tend to oppose redistribution 
policies. A negative relationship between immigration and preferences to redistribution is also 
in line with Moriconi et al. (2019), which provide evidence from the European elections. They 
find that a larger inflow of highly educated migrants leads to more votes towards parties 
supporting the welfare expansion, while, if considering only low educated immigrants, the 
voters tend to switch towards parties less favourable to welfare expansion. As the immigration 
flows in Italy are mainly made by low educated individuals, the results fit together. These 
findings may be motivated by several reasons. First, if the immigrants are perceived to be highly 
dependent to the welfare state, natives may believe that they are bearing their financing cost, 
therefore being less favourable to redistribution policies. Also, natives may perceive a 
competition in the fruition of public services, for example, in the admission to local public 




































































LLS FE NO YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 22,054 22,054 22,054 
R-squared 0.2525 0.2277 0.2248 
 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Column 2 and 3 
include Local Labour Market fixed effects. Time-invariant and time-variant controls at the 
municipality level, yearly GDP at the regional level and year dummies are included in all the 
specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in column 1 and at the Local 




4.3 The role of immigrants’ nationality 
 
In the introduction I pointed out that the factors driving natives’ reaction towards migration 
inflows can have both an economic and a non-economic nature. Among the latter, the natives’ 
negative attitudes towards foreign born citizens may be triggered by a xenophobic sentiment. 
Specifically, natives may perceive the foreign presence as a threat to their established culture 
and system of values. Votes for anti-immigrant parties may in part reflect this. As proved by 
Brunner and Kuhn (2018), in accordance to the group conflict theory, the presence of 
immigrants with a distant cultural background determines an anti-immigration attitude among 
natives, while the preferences are not affected when the immigrants are more culturally close. 
 
4.3.1 Empirical Strategy  
 
To investigate the role of immigrants’ nationality, I include in the model the interaction between 
the explanatory variable and a dummy variable pointing out that in a certain municipality the 
share of immigrant from a specific area of the world in 1991 was very high. Precisely, the 
dummy variable equals 1 if the share of immigrant from a certain area of the world is higher 
than the 80th percentile of the distribution. To provide a more precise analysis, I used data on 
immigrant ethnicity by considering the area of origin in 1991 instead of the imputed quantities 
used to construct the instrument. The following groups of macro-area of origin are considered: 
North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern-Central Europe, South America and Asia. 
Therefore, the model to be estimated is the following: 
 
𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑐 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 ∗ 𝑑91𝑚𝑐 + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ +  𝜆𝑚 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 
 
Where 𝑑91𝑚𝑐 is a dummy equal to 1 if the municipality m in 1991 presented a high share of 
immigrant from country c (higher than the 80th percentile of the distribution). The resulting 
regression has two endogenous variables, namely 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 and  𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 ∗ 𝑑91𝑚𝑐, 
instrumented respectively by the usual prediction of the actual share of immigrant based on its 
historical pattern and its interaction with the dummy indicating a strong presence of immigrants 





The first-stage regressions for the two endogenous variables are: 
 
𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑍𝑚𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑍𝑚𝑡 ∗ 𝑑91𝑐 + 𝛼3 𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ +  𝜆𝑚 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑢𝑚𝑡 
 
𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 ∗ 𝑑91𝑐 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑍𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑚𝑡 ∗ 𝑑91𝑐 + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ +  𝜆𝑚 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝑚𝑡 
 
Hence, the resulting second stage regression is: 
 
𝑦𝑚𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡̂ + 𝛾2𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡̂ ∗ 𝑑91𝑚𝑐 + 𝛾3 𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ +  𝜆𝑚 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜂𝑚𝑡 
 
In this case, the parameter of interest is 𝛾2. If the causal relationship is established, it captures 
the change in natives’ voting behavior when the immigrant share from a certain area of the 
world increases. As stressed in the case of the main regression, the two conditions for the IV 
approach to recover causal estimates are the relevance and exogeneity of the instrument. 
However, with multiple endogenous variables, the conventional F-statistic used to evaluate 
whether the instrument is weak or not is no longer appropriate. In fact, it can be the case that, 
even if the instruments’ F statistics are high, the model is still weakly identified. In the case of 
under identification - less instruments than endogenous variables - the model cannot be 
estimated. In this context, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics allows to test whether the 
equation is identified, meaning that the excluded instruments are correlated with the 
endogenous regressions. The test consists essentially in the test of the rank of a matrix:  under 
the null hypothesis of under-identification, the matrix of reduced form coefficients on the L1 
excluded instruments has rank equals to K1-1, where K1 is the number of endogenous 
regressors. From the Table 6, we notice that the value of the test is high, therefore rejecting the 
null hypothesis of under identification, meaning that the instruments are relevant and the model 
can be estimated. Moreover, the F-statistics are well above the critical values, suggesting that 
our estimates do not suffer of weak instruments. The exogeneity conditions of the instruments 
is further guaranteed by the rupture in the Italian political system occurred in 1992-1994, after 
the “Mani Pulite” scandal, as I explained in the previous section. In the following I will present 
only the results with respect to anti-immigration votes, as the preferences for redistribution 





4.3.2 Results and interpretation 
 
The results in Table 4 suggest that immigrants’ nationality plays a role in determining the effect 
on the votes for anti-immigration parties only in the case South America. Precisely, in those 
municipalities where presence of immigrants from South America is high, a 1 p.p. increase in 
the share of immigrants leads to a 0.14 p.p. increase in the share of votes for anti-immigration 
parties. The effect in the case of North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern-Central Europe 
is positive but not statistically significant while, in the case of immigrant from Asia, the 
coefficient has an opposite sign. Different results with respect to the exposure to different ethnic 
groups may be due to dissimilar integration processes with the Italian culture. According to the 
conflict group theory, in fact, natives may perceive the presence of foreign population as a 
threat that positively correlates with its cultural distance. 
In this regard, Bisin and Tura (2019) studied the cultural integration process of the ethnic 
minorities in the Italian context focusing on the role of the family dimension. This is interpreted 
as an equilibrium phenomenon between the immigrant’ demand for integration and the natives’ 
supply in terms of cultural acceptance. Briefly, the authors estimate a structural model of marital 
matching along cultural characteristics and intra-household decisions, investigating the roles of 
fertility, divorce and cultural socialisation to their children. Specifically, the propensity to 
integrate of one culture depends on the persistency of cultural ethnic transmission, proxied as 
the language spoken by children at home with the family. Focusing on language socialization 
allows to study the level of cultural integration of immigrants into the socio-economic 
environment: evidence prove a positive relationship between proficiency in the destination 
language and the immigrant socio-economic integration, for example by strengthening 
employment opportunities (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003).  
By exploiting the variability in the cultural identity across immigrants in the Italian marriage 
market, the authors estimate the cultural intolerance parameters associated to the different 
groups, expressed as the psychological value that parents obtain by transmitting to their child 
their own ethnic identity, compared to having a child with a different cultural identity. As 
Figure 2 shows, a certain degree of cultural intolerance of migrants towards natives is common 
across all the groups, especially in the case of immigrants from North Africa-Middle East. 
Similarly, the highest cultural intolerance of the Italian is directed towards immigrants 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In a second step, by simulating the model over successive generations, the authors estimate the 
evolution of the distribution of the population by cultural traits, hence being able to study the 
long- run integration patterns of the different ethnic groups in the Italian context. Although the 
immigrants display strong preferences to maintain their own cultural identity, the 75% integrate 
to the Italian culture after the first generation, meaning that 75% of the second-generation 
immigrants speaks Italian at home with their children. However, it is relevant to stress that the 
pace of convergence is heterogeneous across ethnic groups (Figure 3). Immigrants from EU-15 
and Other European countries, but also – in a lesser extent - immigrants from North Africa-
Middle-East converge almost completely to the Italian culture in a single generation, while a 
slower path characterizes the groups from the East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. For what 
concerns the group from South America, the integration process is hampered in the first 
generation and it starts to converge to the Italian culture only after the second generation, 
leading only the 70% of immigrants to be integrated along the language dimension after four 
generations. These different paths in the integration process depend on several factors. The 
faster integration patterns in case of EU-15 and Other European countries strongly depends on 
the low cultural intolerance parameters. On the opposite, higher intolerance parameters justify 
slower integration of the East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa minorities. But intolerance 
parameters are not the only drivers of the integration dynamics of different cultural-ethnic 
groups. Homogamous marriage rates, fertility rates, and other demographic characteristics play 
Notes: This figure reports parameter estimates for the cultural intolerance of migrants versus natives (Panel 
A) and natives versus migrants (Panel B) for all cultural-ethnic minorities from Europe-EU15, Other 
Europe, North Africa/Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Latin America. Source: Bisin and Tura 
(2019) 
Figure 2: Cultural Intolerance Parameters 
37 
 
a relevant role in the simulations. For example, a strong estimated selection into homogamous 
marriages for Sub-Saharan Africa migrants allows them to sustain their cultural heterogeneity. 
Also, the high estimated fertility rate drives the relatively fast integration process of the East 
Asia minorities. Finally, immigrants from South America are able to keep their distinctiveness 
over time given their ability to socialize children also in heterogamous marriages with natives. 
The fact that Latin America group is characterized by very low intolerance parameters and a 
very slow integration path is somewhat counterintuitive. However, the authors point out that a 
native population more prone to accept cultural traits of immigrants might be a double-edged 
sword. If from one side it could make their cultural integration easier and faster, in this case, by 
fostering heterogamous marriages, from the other it allows immigrants to better maintain their 
distinctive cultural traits. Even if the authors focus on a familiar context, the proficiency of the 









It is therefore possible to interpret the results in Table 6 making the following considerations. 
First, the language dimension seems to be fundamental in determining the integration process 
of immigrants. An anti-immigration sentiment is triggered not so much by a mere initial cultural 
diversity, but by the perception that one group is more integrated in the social and cultural 
Figure 3: Long-run Dynamics of Cultural Traits 
This figure shows the long-run dynamics of the distribution of cultural traits in the population for 
minority groups over successive generations. The share of each cultural-ethnic group over the total 
population is indexed to 1 in t=0. Source: Bisin and Tura (2019). 
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environment with respect to the other, fact often allowed by the proficiency of the natives’ 
language (Dustman and Fabbri, 2003). In this regard, the second generations of immigrants 
from of North African, sub Saharan African and Eastern-Central European seem to be well 
integrated in the municipality texture, attenuating the xenophobic sentiment that it would have 
been expected. Eventually, the negative attitudes towards South American citizens may be 
driven by their slow convergence path to the Italian culture. If from one side the high acceptance 
that characterize this group may be positive within the familiar context, it may be an obstacle 
in other social situations. 
 
It has also to be stressed that the presence of Asian immigrants is negatively associated to anti-
immigration parties support, although the effect is quite small. Asian immigrants involve a wide 
range of ethnicities that may be very different to each other as well as the European one, leading 
difficulties to assess if there is one specific cultural feature driving the effect. One of the 
possible explanations justifying this alternative trend may be the substantial presence of the 
Philippine immigrants in the Asian group. They have been present in the Italian territory and 
integrated into the working environment since the 80’s, substantially being employed in the 
domestic housework9. In particular, in 2018, the 59,5% was estimated to work in social and 
personal services, which is characterized by a strong female component. Given the sustained 
proximity in the household dimension and the essentiality of the services provided, it is likely 
that a positive relationship between the Italian and the Philippine culture has been established, 
driving natives to be favourable to new migration inflows. Eventually, it is relevant to stress 
that the magnitude of the coefficients of the share of immigrants are very close to the one found 
in the baseline regression (0.6), strengthening the validity of the results in the previous section. 
 




4.4 Heterogeneous effects 
 
Although the average effect of immigration on voting is positively associated to an increase of 
votes towards anti-immigration parties, it is interesting to stress which features matter in 
degerming this tendency. In the first part, I explore if the size of the effect changes with respect 
to municipality size. Then, I investigate if there is a heterogeneous effect according to the level 
of unemployment, taxable income, social capital and share of children. In this way, some 
underlying mechanism shaping natives’ attitude towards new migration inflows may emerge. 
In this regard, I split the sample according to the distribution of the variables of interest observed 
in 2011 by Local Labour System. 
 
4.4.1 The role of municipality size 
 
Previous studies (Barone et al., 2016, Dustmann et al., 2018) documented that the effect of 
immigration varies with the municipality size, possibly as a result of a different exposure of 
native residents to those of different background. Specifically, the kind of relationships between 
natives and immigrants may be very different in an urban environment with respect to a rural 
one. In the following analysis, I split the sample of Italian municipalities according to the 
population: below 500 inhabitants, between 500 and 5000 inhabitants, between 5000 and 25000 
inhabitants, more than 25000 inhabitants. The Italian municipalities are, on average, very small, 
with a higher concentration of municipalities with a population ranged between 500 and 5000 
inhabitants. The positive and significant coefficients of column 2 and column 3 of Table 6 
below show that the effect on anti-immigration parties is driven by middle-size municipalities. 
The impact is significantly higher in column 3, pointing out that 1 p.p. increase in the share of 
immigrants leads to an increase in support for anti-immigration parties of 0.801 p.p. in those 
municipalities with a population ranged between 5000 and 25000 inhabitants. In very small 
municipalities (column 1) the regression suffers of weak instrument issues (F-Test < 10) and 
therefore the model does not provide consistent estimates. Also, it interesting to notice that the 
result, even if positive, is not significant in the case of big municipalities (more than 25000 
habitants). A valid explanation behind the difference in results could be found by looking at the 
Alport’s contact theory (Alport, 1954). This states that personal contact between the members 
of different ethnic groups leads to a reduction of prejudices and discriminatory behavior, 
improving the relationships between groups and making people more willing to deal with each 
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other as equals. Even if the results of this work seems to reveal the opposite - an increase to 
immigrants exposure is, on average, negatively perceived by natives - there are certain 
conditions under which the contact theory is supported: The equality of status of the different 
groups in contact; their cooperative interdependence in the pursuit of common goals; the 
presence of social norms supporting intergroup contact. In this regard, individuals living in big 
cities are more likely to experience a positive relationship with immigrants, thus living in an 
environment where the above conditions are fulfilled, with respect to citizens living in a rural 
context. For example, Dustmann et al. (2018), by using the EES, found that it is considerably 
more likely that they have an immigrant friend or work colleague. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that in big cities the lack of the effect is due to the segmentation of immigrants living 
quarters, lowering their actual perception among the native population. In this sense, Dustmann 
et al. (2018) found a strong association between exposure to immigrants in one’s immediate 
neighbourhood and a hostile behavior towards them. Therefore, in line with group threat 
theories, a different exposure to immigrants in one’s neighbourhood may lead to different levels 
















































































Observations 2,269 13,065 5,637 1,081 
LLS FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Time-invariant 
covariates 
        YES                       YES          YES   YES 
F-Test        4.41                     66.51          36.04  2.78 
R-squared       0.3017                  0.3436          0.3629  0.4491 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Local Labour Market 
fixed effects, time-invariant and time-variant controls at the municipality level, yearly GDP at the 
regional level, year dummies are included in all the specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the 
Local Labour Market level. 
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4.4.2 Additional findings 
 
As previously stressed, economic theory suggests that the change in natives’ attitudes towards 
migration inflows is shaped by the perceived labour market competition. Specifically, if they 
experience a substitutability relationship, they expect to be penalized by new migration inflows. 
As already proved by Halla et al (2017), we would expect a higher support for anti-immigrant 
parties in those areas where the unemployment rate is higher, hence where the competition in 
the labour market is stronger. Table 7 shows that the effect for anti-immigration parties’ votes 
is driven by municipalities in the middle of distribution, while the effect is not significant in 
those municipalities with a very low unemployment rate. In line with the expectations, 
individuals do not perceive a competition in the labour market when the unemployment rate is 
low. However, natives experiencing very high levels of unemployment seem not to be 
concerned about the competition caused by immigrants. Given the non-significant effect 
(column 3), natives are likely to perceive a sort complementarity in the labour market with 
immigrants, for example because the latter are employed in very low-paid jobs. In this context, 
a further analysis which uses data on immigrants and natives ‘skills would be useful to provide 
more precise conclusions. 
 
A further analysis consists in testing if the effect on anti-immigration parties varies with the 
level of social capital, expressed as the number of no-profits units per 1000 inhabitants. 
Herreros and Criado (2009) proved that societies with a high level of social capital, proxied by 
the level of social trust, has a positive impact on their members’ attitudes towards immigrants. 
According to Putnam (2000), citizens tend to be more cooperative and more engaged in the 
community life when the level of social trust is higher. For example, being involved in no-profit 
or voluntary organizations may help to strengthen social cohesion and the relationship with the 
other citizens, developing an altruistic behavior and departing from the economic hypothesis of 
self-interest. Also, social trust is proved to reduce the perceived threat of immigration in terms, 
for example, on the labour market competition (Herreros and Criado, 2009). Whether the 
welcoming country presents an integrated society is therefore relevant to determine natives’ 
reaction. Therefore, it is more likely that natives perceive the foreign presence in a negative 
way when the level of social capital is lower. In line with the expectations, Table 8 shows that 
the effect on anti-immigration parties is significantly stronger in municipalities on the first 
tercile of the social capital index distribution, while it loses significance considering the middle 
of the distribution. However, it has to be notice that the coefficient became slightly significant, 
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even if lower in magnitude with respect to the first tercile, when the municipalities present a 
very high presence of no-profit units operating in the territory These results stress the fact that 
the positive relationship between social capital and positive attitude towards migration is not 
always trivial. A possibility is that social trust is limited to immigrants with a cultural 
background relatively closer to the natives’ one. In the US, for example, the high levels of social 
capital characterizing the Putnam “civic generation” in the 1940s and 1950s coexisted with a 
high level of racism toward minorities (Hero, 2003). In conclusion, from the analysis it emerges 
that when society has a low level of social capital, the support to anti-immigration parties is 
stronger. However, it is not always true that, when the level of social capital increases, the 
positive effect of a major social cohesion is addressed towards the immigrants’ population. 
Another interesting question investigates if the effect on voting is heterogeneous with respect 
to the citizens taxable income. As previously discussed, natives are concerned of the effect that 
immigration has on the welfare state (Facchini and Mayda, 2009).  In particular, the perception 
that low skilled immigrants represent a burden on the public finance, may lead natives to vote 
for anti-immigration parties. As Dustmann et al. (2018) point out, the high welfare dependency 
of immigrants may lead the more affluent to believe that they are bearing a significant fraction 
of their financing. These findings are in line with the economic hypothesis of self-interest, 
which states that individuals respond to immigration based on their own economic concerns. 
Table 9 shows that the positive effect on anti-immigration parties is significant only in 
municipalities in a Local labour System characterized by a high taxable income per-capita, 
while the effect is not significant in the first tercile of the distribution. Specifically, the 
magnitude and the significance are very strong in the 3rd tercile of the distribution, confirming 
the previous hypothesis. 
The following section provides additional support to the fact that natives are concerned on the 
effect that immigration has on the welfare state.  The results in Table 5 above show that natives 
respond to an increase in immigration rate by lowering the support for redistribution policies. 
In this sense, this can be motivated by the fact that when the foreign presence increases, the 
natives may perceive a stronger competition in the fruition of public services. For example, due 
to an increase of immigrants’ children, native parents may perceive a competition in the 
admission to public school (Halla et. al., 2017) or they may think they may negatively influence 
school quality. To test this hypothesis, I split the sample of municipalities according to the 
distribution of the share of children from 0 to 9 years old. In line of what previously stressed, I 
expect that in municipalities with a higher concentration of children, the dissent towards 
migration is stronger.  Results in Table 10 confirms this intuition. Precisely, the strongest and 
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most significant effect on anti-immigrant parties is on the 2nd and more significant on the 3rd 
tercile of distribution of the share of children, while the effect in not significant when is lower. 
These results suggest that the perception that immigration negatively impact the local welfare 
is a determinant in shaping the voting behavior. 
 
Table 7 
















                                       Unemployment rate 
























LLS FE YES YES YES 
Time-invariant cov. YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 7,750 7,112 7,183 
R-squared 0.3519 0.3120 0.3505 
 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Local Labour Market 
fixed effects, time-invariant and time-variant controls at the municipality level, yearly GDP at the 
regional level, year dummies are included in all the specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the 


























                                       Social Capital Index 
























LLS FE YES YES YES 
Time-invariant cov. YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 7,356 7,400 7,289 
R-squared 0.3697 0.3584 0.3200 
 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Local Labour Market 
fixed effects, time-invariant and time-variant controls at the municipality level, yearly GDP at the 
regional level, year dummies are included in all the specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the 
Local Labour Market level 
Table 8 


























                                       Taxable Income per-capita 
Immigrant share 0.124 
 (0.4078) 
0.473*    
(0.2861)  
     0.901***  
  (0.2986) 
Population 6.72e-08   
 (6.61e-08) 




Population density -3.97e-06*   
 (2.13e-06) 




GDP growth NUTS-2 -0.074 
   (0.1285) 




LLS FE YES YES YES 
Time-invariant cov. YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 7,354 7,382 7,309 
R-squared 0.3056 0.3605 0.3395 
 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Local Labour Market 
fixed effects, time-invariant and time-variant controls at the municipality level, yearly GDP at the 
regional level, year dummies are included in all the specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the 
Local Labour Market level 
Table 9 























                                       Share of children aged 0-9 
Immigrant share 0.438 
   (0.4091) 
0.783**    
(0.3071) 
0.632**   
(0.2672) 
Population 2.98e-08    
(1.01e-07) 
5.16e-08   
 (5.63e-08) 
2.58e-08**  
  (1.19e-08) 
Population density -7.40e-07 
(0.000012) 
-0.000015* 
  (8.38e-06) 
-0.000012***   
 (3.71e-06) 




-0.535***    
(0.1604) 
LLS FE YES YES YES 
Time-invariant cov. YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 7,426 7,280 7,339 
R-squared 0.3608 0.3578 0.3524 
 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Local Labour Market 
fixed effects, time-invariant and time-variant controls at the municipality level, yearly GDP at the 
regional level, year dummies are included in all the specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the 
Local Labour Market level. 
Table 10 




4.5 Robustness check 
 
This section describes a series of tests to check the primary results of this work. First, for what 
concerns the specification estimating the impact on the vote share for anti-immigrant parties, I 
change the dependent variable as the vote share for parties promoting pro-immigrant policies. 
The classification of these parties follows the same procedure described above. Precisely, I 
considered the votes of those parties that are in the lower part of the distribution on the 
“IMMIGRATE_POLICY” indicator in the CHES classification for every election year10. Given 
that the main results proved that, on average, natives tend to be averse to new migration inflows, 
it is reasonable to expect that the votes for parties supporting favourable migration policies 
decrease. Even if the OLS estimates, controlling for municipalities time invariant 
characteristics, point out a positive coefficient, when I introduce the LLS fixed effect and the 
IV estimator, the coefficient turns negative and statistically significant. In fact, from Column 3 
of Table 11, it emerges that 1 p.p. increase in the share of migrants causes a 0.298 p.p. decrease 
in the vote share for pro-immigration parties.  
For what concerns the specification estimating the impact on the preference for redistribution, 
I conducted the analysis keeping the indicator of a party with respect to its position on 
redistribution as constant for the whole period of the analysis. This allows to consider a change 
in redistribution index in a municipality as a shift in citizens vote and not to the change in the 
indicator. As a check, I use the average of indicators over the 2008, 2013 and 2018. The result 
in column 3 (Table 12) is in line – slightly higher – than the previous estimate, meaning that 
the hypothesis of keeping the indicator constant is valid. Also, I repeat the estimates considering 
a different functional form for the dependent variable. When expressing the redistribution index 
in log, the estimated coefficient 𝛾1 in eq. 4 can be interpreted in terms of elasticity, representing 
the percentage variation in the index due to an increase of 1 p.p. in the immigration share. The 
results in table show that 1 p.p. in the increase in immigrants share increase the redistribution 
index of 0.869% the redistribution index. 
It is important to remark that in the regressions conducted in this analysis I employed the Local 
Labour System fixed effects because, as previously discussed,  the municipalities fixed effects 
would have absorbed all the variability across observations, producing not significant estimates. 
Local Labour System fixed effects allow to control for time-invariant characteristics that are 
constant within the same LLS. To better control for the heterogeneity between municipality in 
 
10 Democratic Party, Italy of Values, Left Ecology Freedom, Italian Socialist Party, Party of Italian Communists 
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the same LLS I employed time invariants-covariates at municipality level computed in 2011. 
In order to check if the LLS fixed effects can be regarded a valid alternative to the more precise 
municipality fixed effect, I repeat the estimates without the municipalities time-invariants 
covariates. Form Table 13 below, it emerges that the coefficients are slightly less, but consistent 

























































































LLS FE NO YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 22,054 22,054 22,054 
R-squared 0.3265 0.2953 0.2948 
 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Local Labour Market 
fixed effects, time-invariant and time-variant controls at the municipality level, yearly GDP at the 
regional level, year dummies are included in all the specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the 













                                  Semi- elasticities 






LLS FE NO YES YES 
Time-invariant controls YES YES YES 
Time-variant controls YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 22,054 22,054 22,054 
R-squared 0.1431 0.1154 0.1180 
                                Average index 
Immigrant share 0.345* 
(0.2012)      
2.482** 
  (0.9840) 
3.564***  
  (1.1001) 
LLS FE NO YES YES 
Time-invariant controls YES YES YES 
Time-variant controls YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 22,054 22,054 22,054 







*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Local Labour Market 
fixed effects, time-invariant and time-variant controls at the municipality level, yearly GDP at the 
regional level, year dummies are included in all the specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the 























Immigrant share 0.449** 
(0.1802) 





-1.47e-07   
 (1.22e-07)    
 










LLS fixed effect YES YES  
Time-invariant cov. NO NO  
Year fixed effect YES YES  
Observations 22,054 22,054  
R-squared 0.2847 0.1939  
 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Local Labour Market 
fixed effects, time-invariant and time-variant controls at the municipality level, yearly GDP at the 
regional level, year dummies are included in all the specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the 






This paper aims at analysing the effect of immigration on natives’ political preferences. By 
focusing on a panel of Italian municipalities during the 2008, 2013 and 2018 national elections, 
it provides evidence on the causality between these two variables. Specifically, an increase in 
foreign presence leads natives to support anti-immigration parties and to decrease the support 
for parties promoting redistribution policies. This reveals a general negative attitude towards 
new migration inflows. Specifically, natives’ reaction may be driven by economic concerns, 
like the perceived negative effect on labour market or on the welfare state, or by the threat of 
the cultural diversity. In this regard, it emerges that the support for anti-immigration parties is 
triggered in the case of immigrants from South America, while the effect is not significant in 
the case of African and Eastern-Central European immigrants, and it has opposite sign when 
considering immigrants from Asia. Different attitudes towards different ethnic groups are likely 
to derive by their ability to integrate to the Italian culture. In this context, the language 
dimension seems to be fundamental in determining the integration process of immigrants, as it 
influences also other social and working relationships. It is estimated that second generations 
of immigrants from North Africa, sub Saharan Africa and Central Europe converge almost 
completely to the Italian culture, attenuating the xenophobic sentiment that it would have been 
expected. On the opposite, the negative attitudes towards South American citizens may be 
driven by a slower convergence path. As Bisin and Tura (2019) point out, if from one side the 
cultural acceptance that characterizes this group is positive within a familiar context, at the 
same time it allows immigrants to better maintain their distinctive cultural traits, slowing their 
integration process in the society. For what concern the heterogeneity analysis, in line with the 
findings of Barone et al. (2016) and Dustmann et al. (2018), the effect on anti-immigration 
parties is absent in case of big cities, where the population overcomes the 25000 inhabitants. In 
this regard, individuals living in cities are more likely to experience a positive relationship with 
immigrants – for example, having an immigrants as a friend or colleague - and thus living in an 
environment where the Alport’s contact theory conditions are fulfilled. Also, it is proved that 
natives are concerned about the implications of immigration on the welfare state. The effect on 
anti-immigration parties is stronger in those municipalities with a higher taxable income per 
capita, in line with the idea that richer individuals are worried they have to bear all the cost 
financing immigration expenditure, and in those municipalities where the share of children is 
higher, pointing out that natives are likely to perceive a competition in the public schools 
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admission. The role of social capital is ambiguous. The effect on votes is strongly driven by 
municipalities with a lower level of social capital, where the sense of community and altruistic 
behavior is likely to be scarce. However, the fact that an anti-immigration sentiment is spread 
also in municipalities where the level of social capital is high, may lead to the conclusion that 
the  social trust is limited to population with a cultural background close to the natives’ one. 
Eventually, the impact on votes for anti-immigration parties is significant only in municipalities 
in the middle of the distribution of the unemployment rate. Citizens living in areas where the 
level of unemployment is higher seem not to perceive the immigrant presence as a threat 
generating competition in the labour market, perhaps because of a perceived (or actual) 
complementarity. In this case, a further analysis exploiting immigrants’ and natives ‘skills 
would be appropriate to provide more precise conclusions. 
Overall, the findings show that immigration matters in determining citizens’ political 
preferences. Policy makers should take into account the increasing size of this phenomenon, 
especially focusing on the drivers shaping natives’ attitudes. However, a deeper analysis would 
require an investigation on the validity of the labour market or welfare concerns, trying to assess 
if the natives’ behavior is justified by a real economic impact. Bellucci et al. (2020) move in 
this direction by assessing the effect of the perceived size of the migratory phenomenon in Italy. 
It would be interesting to explore to what extent the perception on the labour market and welfare 
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Table A.3: Immigrants’ ethnicity composition and preference for redistribution, IV. 
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